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Abstract
We present evidence on the changing dynamics of the yield curve from 1998 to
2011. We identify four different phases. As expected, the financial crisis represents
a period of elevated yield volatility, but it can be split into two distinct periods. The
split occurs when the Federal Reserve reached the zero lower bound. This bound
suppressed volatility in the short end of the yield curve while increasing volatility
in the long end — despite lower overall volatility in financial markets. In line with
previous studies, we find that announcements with regard to the Federal Reserve’s
large scale asset purchases reduce longer term yields. We also quantify the effect
of widely observed economic news, such as the non-farm payrolls and other items,
on the yield curve.
Keywords: term structure of interest rates, financial crisis, interest rate
dynamics, LSAP, unconventional monetary policy.
JEL classification: E43, E52.
1. Introduction
The yield curve on U.S. Treasury securities is one of the most closely watched
data of the global economy. Understanding its dynamics is a preoccupation of many
financial markets participants as well as academics. In this paper, we investigate
how the dynamics of the yield curve were affected by the financial crisis and the
subsequent policy responses using the “intelligible factors” framework of Lengwiler
and Lenz (2010).
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those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank for International Settlements.
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We identify four different phases of yield curve dynamics since 1998 (Section 3).
After a “normal” phase ending mid-2004 we observe a period that is character-
ized by a conspicuous absence of volatility in yields. This “moderation” phase ends
with the beginning of the financial crisis in August 2007. The first part of the cri-
sis, which we label “liquidity crisis,” was characterized by money market turmoil
and liquidity problems. Accordingly, we observe huge volatility in the short and
medium maturity spectrum of the yield curve. This pattern abruptly changes in
December 2008, after the Federal Reserve reached the zero lower bound. Since
then, we observe a lack of perturbations at short maturities, but unusually large
volatility in the long maturity spectrum of the yield curve. Reaching the zero lower
bound appears in our analysis to be a significant event that has quantitatively
changed the dynamics of the yield curve.
Our second result (Section 4) concerns the identification of the most important
shocks. We quantify and locate in the maturity spectrum the most significant
shocks, e.g. 9/11, the Lehman collapse, the rescue of AIG, or the increase of the
large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) in March 2009.
Our third result (Section 5) concerns the measurement of the effect of surprises
in key macroeconomic data on the yield curve. In particular, we measure how
deviations of published indicators, such as non-farm payrolls, jobless claims, and
other items, from expected values affect the yield curve over the whole maturity
spectrum. We find that these surprises do indeed correlate with yield curve shocks,
but the connection has become weaker in the crisis.
2. Intelligible factors
We use the decomposition of the term structure into “intelligible factors” devel-
oped by Lengwiler and Lenz (2010). We have M maturities that we observe on T
days. Let r t(m) denote the interest rate for a zero bond at time t which matures at
time t+m. The cross section of interest rates is described by three factors,
r t(m)= k1(m)φ1,t+k2(m)φ2,t+k3(m)φ3,t+²t(m), (1)
where k ([M×3] matrix) are the loadings and φ ([3×T] matrix) are time-varying
factors. φ and k are constructed together so that they have certain desirable prop-
erties.
Firstly, constraints are imposed on the loadings k, such that they load on differ-
ent parts of the maturity spectrum, as can be seen from Figure 1. The first factor is
the only one that loads on the very long end of the maturity spectrum, so we call φ1
the long factor. The second factor is the only one that loads on the very short end
of the maturity spectrum, so we call φ2 the short factor. The third factor has zero
loading at the short and the long end of the maturity spectrum, but it is normalized
in such a way that it achieves unit loading somewhere in the middle. We call this
the curvature factor.1
1Note that these loadings differ from the more common loadings “level,” “slope,” and “curva-
ture,” which have become custom in applications of principal component analysis (Litterman and
Scheinkman, 1991) or in the specification of Nelson and Siegel (1987).
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Figure 1: Loadings of the three factors.
Secondly, the dynamics of the factors φ is described by a vector auto-regression
(VAR),
φt =D0+D1φt−1+·· ·+Dpφt−p+ut, (2)
where φt = [φ1,t,φ2,t,φ3,t]′ and D0, · · · ,Dp are the coefficient matrices of the VAR.
We set p large enough so that the factor innovations ut become serially uncorre-
lated. As described in Lengwiler and Lenz (2010), the shape of the loadings k is
adjusted in such a way that the factor innovations u are also uncorrelated with
each other. As a result, the covariance matrix of the innovations, E[uu′], is diago-
nal, and the VAR is structural in that sense.
The result of this procedure is a set of loadings that describe the long end, the
short end, and the curvature of the yield curve. The dynamics of these factors are
described by a structural VAR model.
We use the constant maturity yield curve data produced by the US Treasury.
These estimates are generated from secondary market quotes of US Treasury debt,
and interpolated with splines to yield estimates at given, constant times to ma-
turity.2 We use observations at three and six months, and one, two, three, five,
seven, ten, and twenty years. We use daily observed data from January 2, 1998
to November 8, 2011 (worth 3468 business days). We repeat the estimation pre-
sented in Lengwiler and Lenz (2010) with this expanded data set. We find that we
need thirty lags in the VAR to remove serial correlation of the innovations. The
estimated factors are shown in Figure 2.
The innovations u are uncorrelated white noise random variables by construc-
tion. They drive the dynamics of the factors and thus of the term structure. Through
2See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/
Pages/yieldmethod.aspx for a description of the methodology.
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Figure 2: Estimated Intelligible Factors
the VAR dynamics, an innovation into one factor has the potential to ultimately af-
fect all the factors as time passes. However, as was already discussed in Lengwiler
and Lenz (2010), it is an important stylized fact of the intelligible factors decom-
position that innovations into the short and the long factor essentially only affect
themselves: there is very little spillover on the other factors. Innovations into the
curvature factor, in contrast, are the main drivers of movements of the curvature
and the short factor. As a result, curvature innovations are by far the most impor-
tant source of the overall yield curve dynamics.
This stylized fact is also true in the extended data sample. Figure 3 depicts
the variance decomposition, i.e. the parts of the variance of the interest rates that
are due to the innovations into the three factors, u. The variance decomposition
reveals, firstly, the model captures the second moment of the yields — the term
structure of interest rate variance — very well, and, secondly, confirms that most
of the yield curve movements have their source in innovations into the curvature
factor.
3. Four phases of term structure dynamics
Visual inspection of the innovations reveals that their volatility has not been
constant throughout the sample. In order to measure this, we compute the “local
volatility” of the factor innovations, see Figure 4.3 The financial crisis is clearly
visible in this graph, but we can distinguish two phases. Beginning in August
2007, the volatilities of the short and the curvature innovations explode, and stay
high until end of 2008. After that they go back to pre-crisis levels. The volatility
of long factor innovations also increases in 2007, but becomes particularly large
end of 2008. It remains high until the end of the sample. Today, the long factor
innovations appear much more volatile than before the crisis. The same is not true
3“Local volatility” is a non-parametric measure of the second moment. It is essentially a
Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression on the squared innovations; details are explained in Appendix
A.
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Figure 3: Variance of yields of different maturities and shares explained by the three types of
innovations.
for the short and curvature innovations.
This pattern becomes even clearer if we focus attention only on the largest in-
novations. To that avail, we compute standardized innovations, i.e. we divide the
three factor innovations by their unconditional standard deviations. Figure 5 de-
picts those standardized innovations that are significantly different from zero at
95% confidence (so greater than 1.96 in absolute terms). We can distinguish four
phases.
The first phase begins at the start of our sample and ends roughly at mid-2004
(we chose end of July). In this phase we see approximately what we would expect
to see. In fact, the three standardized innovations are independent and serially un-
correlated random variables with unit variance. If they are normally distributed,
for each individual series, 5% of the observations should be significantly different
from zero. During this first phase, this is more or less what we observe: 3.7% of the
long innovations, 2.6% of the short innovations, and 4.7% of the curvature innova-
tions are significantly different from zero. One might label this period the “normal
phase.”
The second phase begins August 2004 and ends August 2007. We call this the
“moderation phase.” The exact timing between the normal and the moderation
phase is difficult to pinpoint. The end of the moderation phase, however, is con-
nected to an important event, namely BNP Paribas’s announcement that it was
freezing three funds invested in sub-prime securities, which is commonly taken to
mark the beginning of the financial crisis. This second phase is characterized by
the marked absence of large innovations. Only 0.7% and 0.5% of the innovations
into the long and the short factor are significantly different from zero. For the cur-
vature, the number is 1.3%. Thus, this phase has very low volatility, and thus the
5
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Figure 4: Innovations and local volatilities (in basis points).
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standardized innovations turn out to be small and statistically insignificant.
This has dramatically changed with the financial crisis, which we can split
into two separate phases. Phase number three, which we call the “liquidity cri-
sis phase,” begins on August 9, 2007 and ends on December 16, 2008. This is the
date when the Federal Open Market Committee lowered the target for the effective
federal funds rate to a 0 to 25 basis points (bps) range and effectively reached the
zero lower bound. This phase was characterized by the freezing of the interbank
money market and substantial liquidity interventions by the Federal Reserve; in
particular later in the period. Accordingly, we observe 23.4% of the innovations into
the short factor that are significantly different from zero. For curvature, the num-
ber is also very large, 19.5%. Long factor innovations are also more volatile than
before, but to a lesser extent: 8.9% of the days feature a long factor innovation that
is significantly different from zero in this phase.
The fourth, the “zero lower bound phase,” begins after the Federal Reserve has
reached the zero lower bound and lasts to the end of the sample. With no room
downward on the federal funds rate, and traditional instruments of monetary pol-
icy exhausted, the volatility in the short and the curvature innovations vanishes.
Only 0.3% and 2.5% of the innovations of these factors are significant. In contrast,
12.2% of the long factor innovations are now significantly different from zero.
We ran breakpoint tests (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003) for the long, short, and
curvature innovations, respectively. The tests for the short and the curvature inno-
vations both find a break in early August 2007. All tests find a break in late 2008,
but the dates differ. For the long innovations a third break is found in late 2009.
For the period before the financial crisis, no consistent breaks are found across the
three series.
Table 1: Significant shocks to the yield curve during the four phases.
theoretical normal phase great moderation liquidity crisis zero lower bound
# cases share # cases share # cases share # cases share
long only 4.51% 49 2.98% 5 0.66% 14 4.14% 77 10.6%
short only 4.51% 30 1.82% 4 0.53% 50 14.8% 0 0.00%
curv only 4.51% 57 3.46% 10 1.32% 36 10.7% 4 0.55%
long & short only 0.24% 1 0.06% 0 0.00% 5 1.48% 0 0.00%
long & curv only 0.24% 9 0.55% 0 0.00% 6 1.78% 12 1.65%
short & curv only 0.24% 10 0.61% 0 0.00% 19 5.62% 2 0.27%
all three 0.01% 2 0.12% 0 0.00% 5 1.48% 0 0.00%
Table 1 reports similar information as Figure 5 but focuses on the joint distri-
bution of the innovations across days. Counting just significant or non-significant
innovations, eight combinations are possible on any given day. The most likely pos-
sibility is that none of the innovations is significant. Theoretically, that should hap-
pen with probability 0.953 = 86%. The long innovation should be significant while
the short and the curvature innovations are not with probability 0.05× 0.952 =
4.5%, etc. The least likely case is that all three innovations are significant on the
same day. This event should be observed only in 0.053 = 0.01% of the days. The the-
8
oretical values for the cases with at least one significant innovation are reported in
the first column of Table 1. The remaining columns contrast this with the actual
measurement in the four phases. We observe more or less what we should observe
if the shocks are independently and normally distributed in the “normal phase.”
In the “great moderation phase” there are clearly too few significant innovations.
In the “liquidity crisis phase” we observe way too many short and curvature in-
novations. In particular, we also find nineteen days where we observe significant
contemporaneous short and curvature innovations. Theory would have predicted
zero or one such day. There are even five days where all three innovations are
significant. In the “zero lower bound phase,” finally, significant short innovations
have completely vanished and significant curvature innovations are far below the
theoretical expectation. Instead, there is a large density of significant long factor
innovations.
The shift of the location of the innovations during the financial crisis, and in
particular to the longer part of the maturity spectrum when the zero lower bound
became binding, also manifests itself in the variance attribution. We compute the
variance of the yields separately for the four phases; see Figure 6 and compare with
Figure 3 for the whole sample. The differences are striking. First of all, the overall
variance of the yields has dramatically decreased for shorter maturities in the “zero
lower bound phase.” This is a direct corollary of the fact that the zero lower bound
does not allow rates to decrease further, and the Federal Reserve has not allowed
the short rates to increase, hence volatility in this duration spectrum has vanished.
As a result, all the volatility that remains is at longer maturities. The volatilities of
the ten- and twenty-year yields is more or less unchanged for the two subperiods.
Yet, because no further movements at the short end are possible, and the major
innovations now occur in the long factor, almost all of the term structure of yield
variance can be attributed to long innovations.
4. (Reverse) Event Study
In this section we relate the largest innovations that we measure to identifi-
able events. We rely on a variety of sources. For Federal Reserve news we use
press release information from the website of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. For market news, we rely in the early years
of our sample period, we rely on next day summaries of financial market activity
from the New York Times — with a particular focus on the Treasury market. Af-
ter September 2004, we use daily press summaries from Wrightson ICAP. These
press summaries are produced towards the end of the business day and are made
available for clients before the close of business. They contain so-called “wraps”
for different financial markets (including Treasuries) as well as a list of the news
stories that are likely to make the headlines the following day. For the part of the
sample that covers the height of the financial crisis, we also use the financial crisis
time line of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for robustness.4 In addition,
4timeline.stlouisfed.org
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Figure 6: Variance of yields of different maturities and shares explained by the three types of
innovations, in the four phases.
we also check whether announcement by the Treasury department concerning its
funding needs or issuing strategy might be related to our yield curve innovations.5
We find, however, no evidence that they contain relevant information.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 collect the twenty-five largest innovations (in absolute terms)
for the long, short, and curvature factor, respectively, and also report potentially
related economic or financial events. To better gauge the size of these innovations
we also divide them, in the seventh column, by the unconditional standard de-
viation, by the local volatility estimate for that day (the eighth column) and the
conditional GARCH volatility estimate (the ninth column). We also report simple
first differences of some key interest rates.
Some dates are particularly noteworthy. We measure a −37 bps shock in the
short and a −49 bps shock in the curvature factor on the day the markets reopened
after the 9/11 attacks. These are 5.6 and 11.0 standard deviation events, respec-
tively. The greatest short factor innovation, however, is measured the day of the
AIG bailout (−88 bps).
The Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 shows up as a large innova-
tions in all three factors simultaneously: we measure innovations into the long
factor (−23 bps), the short factor (−32 bps), and the curvature (−26 bps) on that
day. This amounts to shocks between 3.5 and 5.9 standard deviations of the respec-
tive innovation series.
Notable is also the (perverse) effect of the S&P downgrade of U.S. government
5www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/quarterly-refunding/Pages/
default.aspx.
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Table 2: Twenty-five most important innovations to the long factor. The second columns reports
the size of the innovation in basis points (bps), and, in parenthesis, relative to the unconditional
and the local volatility of that day, respectively. For instance, the largest absolute long innovation
is measured on March 18, 2009. We measure a −53 bps shock. This is 8.0 times the unconditional
standard deviation of the long innovation series, and it is 12.3 times larger that the local volatility
of that day.
date innovation event
2011-10-31 −22 [3.4, 2.0] Greek PM Papandreou announces referendum on
Eurozone debt deal.
2011-10-27 +23 [3.4, 2.1] Euro summit on Greek debt
2011-09-22 −23 [3.4, 2.1] one day after Operation Twist 2 was announced
2011-08-24 +21 [3.2, 1.9] French government unveiles a EUR 12 billion
deficit cutting package
2011-08-11 +25 [3.7, 2.2] Bad bond auction three days after downgrade and
two days after Fed’s forward guidance.
2011-08-09 −22 [3.3, 1.9] “Forward guidance” : Low federal funds rate
through mid-2013
2011-08-08 −25 [3.9, 2.3] downgrade of US government debt by S&P
2010-12-14 +25 [3.7, 2.5] confirmation of reinvestment policy and purchase
of $600 billion of longer-term Treasuries; little
likelihood of increase of QE 2
2010-12-07 +23 [3.5, 2.3] (no relevant news)
2009-06-01 +30 [4.6, 2.8] surprisingly strong data sapped the safe-haven
appeal of government debt
2009-05-27 +24 [3.6, 2.2] concerns about the growing supply of bonds
2009-03-18 −53 [8.0, 4.3] QE 1 enlargement: Additional $750 billion agency
MBS and $100 billion agency debt; $300 in longer-
term Treasuries.
2009-02-17 −29 [4.3, 2.3] worries about European banks spurred investors
to seek safety in U.S. government debt
2008-12-01 −25 [3.7, 2.1] Bernanke: Fed could purchase Treasuries
2008-11-25 −27 [4.0, 2.3] QE 1: Initial large-scale-asset-purchase an-
nouncement: $500 billion agency MBS and $100
billion agency debt.
2008-11-20 −26 [4.0, 2.3] jobless claims reach new record
2008-09-15 −23 [3.5, 2.8] Lehman bankruptcy
2004-04-02 +25 [3.7, 3.9] (no relevant news)
2003-01-02 +26 [3.9, 3.8] (no relevant news)
2002-11-07 −22 [3.4, 2.7] one day after 50 bps cut
2001-12-07 +25 [3.7, 2.8] (no relevant news)
2001-11-15 +22 [3.3, 2.5] dimmed hopes for further rate cuts due to positive
news
2001-01-03 +27 [4.1, 4.0] 50 bps cut
1998-10-09 +23 [3.5, 2.8] (no relevant news)
1998-10-08 +25 [3.8, 3.1] rumors of unwinding of a carry trade by a hedge
fund
11
Table 3: Twenty-five most important innovations to the short factor; see Table 2 for explanation.
date innovation event
2008-10-20 +46 [6.9, 2.2] Government measures show signs of reviving the
frozen money market, causing an exodus out of ul-
trasafe short-dated Treasuries.
2008-10-16 +32 [4.8, 1.4] (no relevant news)
2008-10-10 −35 [5.3, 1.6] Early close ahead of Columbus day. Flight to safe
haven.
2008-09-23 −43 [6.5, 1.2] Bernanke supports TARP
2008-09-19 +78 [11.8, 1.8] Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Mar-
ket Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and
ABCP MMMF Liquidity Facility
2008-09-17 −88 [13.3, 2.1] AIG bailout
2008-09-15 −32 [4.8, 0.8] Lehman bankruptcy
2008-03-24 +57 [8.7, 2.3] FRBNY announces that it will provide term fi-
nancing to facilitate JPMorgan Chase’s acquisi-
tion of Bear Stearns.
2008-03-19 −31 [4.7, 1.3] One day after 75 bps cut. Reduction of required
capital for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
2008-03-18 −36 [5.5, 1.5] 75 bps cut
2008-01-22 −49 [7.4, 2.4] 75 bps cut
2007-12-24 +36 [5.5, 2.2] (no relevant news)
2007-09-04 +51 [7.7, 2.1] money market turmoil
2007-08-29 −36 [5.4, 1.1] money market turmoil
2007-08-27 +51 [7.7, 1.5] money market turmoil
2007-08-24 +37 [5.5, 1.0] money market turmoil
2007-08-21 +46 [7.0, 1.2] money market turmoil
2007-08-20 −70 [10.6, 1.9] money market turmoil
2007-08-15 −49 [7.4, 1.5] money market turmoil after BNP Paribas write-
down
2001-09-13 −37 [5.6, 2.2] market reopens after terrorist attacks, Fed will
“provide whatever liquidity might be needed”
2000-12-26 +69 [10.5, 2.2] (no relevant news)
2000-12-21 −43 [6.6, 1.6] speculation that Federal Reserve may lower inter-
est rates before their scheduled meeting at the end
of January.
1998-10-19 +40 [6.1, 1.8] Two days (!) after 50 bps rate cut, reversing move
of short factor a day earlier.
1998-10-16 −49 [7.4, 2.0] One day after 50 bps rate cut.
1998-10-08 −31 [4.8, 1.9] rumors of unwinding of a carry trade by a hedge
fund
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Table 4: Twenty-five most important innovations to the curvature factor; see Table 2 for explana-
tion.
date innovation event
2009-06-05 +29 [6.5, 3.6] smaller than expected drop in non-farm payrolls
2008-12-17 +17 [3.8, 3.1] One day after rate cut to 0 to 0.25. FOMC state-
ment mentions the possibility to purchase longer
maturity debt.
2008-10-20 +18 [4.1, 2.2] Government measures show signs of reviving the
frozen money market, causing an exodus out of ul-
trasafe short-dated Treasuries.
2008-10-02 −19 [4.2, 1.5] rise in jobless claims and worse-than expected fac-
tory orders
2008-09-29 −23 [5.1, 1.8] Fed: Expansion of FX Swap lines. The U.S. House
of Representatives rejects legislation submitted by
the Treasury Department requesting authority to
purchase troubled assets from financial institu-
tions.
2008-09-19 +30 [6.7, 2.3] Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Mar-
ket Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and
ABCP MMMF Liquidity Facility
2008-09-17 −21 [4.7, 1.6] AIG bailout
2008-09-16 +17 [3.9, 1.4] rate unchanged
2008-09-15 −26 [5.9, 2.1] Lehman bankruptcy
2008-06-12 +15 [3.5, 1.6] (no relevant news)
2008-06-09 +31 [7.0, 3.2] Better looking housing data
2008-03-18 +19 [4.3, 2.2] 75 bps cut
2008-03-11 +22 [5.1, 2.5] Joint statement of central banks of United States,
England, ECB, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, and
Sweden. Federal Reserve action: Term Secu-
rities Lending Facility (TSLF), Fed lends up to
$200 billion of Treasury securities against agency
debt, agency MBS, and non-agency AAA/Aaa-
rated MBS.
2008-01-22 −26 [6.0, 3.5] 75 bps cut
2007-11-15 −16 [3.7, 2.1] bad job claims report
2004-08-06 −17 [3.8, 3.8] bad non-farm pay-rolls report
2004-05-07 +19 [4.3, 3.4] unexpectedly strong employment report
2002-08-14 +16 [3.7, 2.4] (no relevant news)
2002-03-08 +21 [4.7, 3.4] Chairman Greenspan provides a positive outlook,
saying that an expansion was already “well under
way.”
2001-12-07 −16 [3.6, 2.1] (no relevant news)
2001-11-29 −20 [4.5, 2.4] correction following Enron and Japan downgrade
2001-09-13 −49 [11.0, 3.9] market reopens after terrorist attacks, Fed will
“provide whatever liquidity might be needed”
2001-01-05 −19 [4.3, 2.3] weaker than expected nonfarm payrolls
2001-01-02 −18 [4.1, 2.2] (no relevant news)
1998-10-16 −24 [5.4, 3.0] one day after 50 bps rate cut
13
debt on August 8, 2011. On that day we measure a large negative innovation in the
long factor (−25 bps). A possible interpretation might be that the downgrade has
produced a flight for safety (“Europe will be next”) and thus increased the demand
for U.S. debt.
Overall, we note that the larger volatility of long factor innovations in the “zero
lower bound” phase is only partly due to announcements concerning unconven-
tional monetary policy measures. Of the twenty-five events reported in Table 2,
thirteen occurred in the “zero lower bound” phase. Only four of these large inno-
vations are related to announcements of the Fed concerning unconventional mon-
etary policy. These are, the enlargement of QE 1 (March 18, 2009, −53 bps), the
confirmation of the reinvestment policy (December 14, 2010, +25 bps), one day af-
ter operation twist 2 was announced (September 22, 2011, −23 bps), and finally
the “forward guidance” announcement (August 9, 2011, −22 bps). All other ma-
jor shocks were due to business cycle surprises or are related to the crisis of the
European currency union. This point is nicely illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Major long factor innovations in the zero lower bound phase. The last five months of the
sample are depicted separately in the right-hand panel because there is more action there.
5. News
It is well-documented that economic news releases and in particular surprises
from market expectations move Treasury yields (see e.g. Fleming and Remolona,
1999). Not surprisingly, a similar relationship holds for our factors. A natural ques-
tion is whether or not the changing dynamics of the yield curve can (in part) be ex-
plained by changing dynamics in terms of economic news surprises. Table 5 shows
the results of regressing innovations into our long, short, and curvature factors on
14
day-of-release surprises for a range of economic indicators. The indicators we con-
sider include the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Indexr, the Institute for
Supply Management (ISM) purchasing managers index (PMI), the advance GDP
print, the unemployment rate, industrial production, retail sales, housing starts,
one-family houses sold, the personal consumption expenditure price index, capac-
ity utilization, initial jobless claims, the leading economic indicator index, and the
federal funds rate target. We measure surprises as the difference between the ac-
tual value released and the median value from an “expectations” survey among
Wall Street economists conducted by Bloomberg News prior to the release. To put
the surprises on a common scale we standardized them by their standard devia-
tion over the sample. Moreover, we switch the sign of some surprise variables, so
that a positive surprise is “good news.” For instance, non-farm payroll surprises
are measured as actual release minus median expectation, whereas jobless claims
are defined the other way around. In addition, we control for non-linear effects by
including the squared standardized surprises as additional regressors.
Besides the results for the entire sample, we also split our sample in two with a
view to investigating whether or not the impact of economic news has changed with
the financial crisis. Our “pre-crisis” sample runs from 1998 to August 8, 2007 (“nor-
mal” and “great moderation” phases) and the “crisis” sample covers the remainder
of our sample (“liquidity crisis” and “zero lower bound” phases). Furthermore, be-
cause our left-hand variables exhibit clustered volatility (see Section 3 and Figure 4
in particular), we use the EGARCH specification. In order to capture general mar-
ket volatility we add the VIX as an exogenous variable to the variance equation.
We also add dummies for our phases that we identified in Section 3 to the variance
equation.
Consistent with previous literature we find that the non-farm payrolls data is
among the most informative signal. This was the case before the crisis, and has
remained so: non-farm payroll surprises (linear and squared) have highly signif-
icant effects on all three yield curve factors. PMI surprises used to be significant
predictors of all three innovations before the crisis; since the crisis they contain in-
formation only on long innovations. Surprises about retail sales and about capacity
utilization used to contain information on long and curvature innovations before
the crisis; in the crisis, retail sales surprises seem to no longer affect the curva-
ture, and capacity utilization has lost its connection to the yield curve completely.
Surprises about jobless claims used to affect curvature innovations before the cri-
sis, but now affects long innovations instead. Surprises concerning the FOMC’s
federal funds target rate used to be highly significant with respect to short factor
innovations; they have lost their explanatory power during the crisis. Prior to the
financial crisis, our economic surprise indicators could account for 4.5%, 1.5%, and
6.6% of the variation in the long, short and curvature factors (as measured by the
R2-statistic). In our crisis sample, the comparable numbers are 3.2%, 0.3%, and
0.9%.
The phase dummies in the variance equation partially verify our partition of
the sample into four phases. Interestingly, the “great moderation” dummy is not
significant. The general reduction of the volatility of our innovations between 1998
15
and the beginning of the financial crisis seems fully captured by the VIX. The two
other phase dummies, however, come in as significant as expected. The “liquidity
crisis” dummy measures a higher volatility for short and curvature innovations,
but is not significant in the variance equation of the long innovations. The “zero
lower bound” dummy, on the other hand, measures a significantly higher volatility
of long factor innovations, but significantly lower volatility of the short factor in-
novations. With respect to curvature innovations, this coefficient is either negative
(pointing to a reduced volatility of curvature shocks in this phase) or statistically
insignificant.
6. Conclusions
The financial crisis has deeply affected financial markets as well as the economy
as a whole. This has also affected the yield curve and its dynamics. We document
these changes in this paper. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
Firstly, we divide the dynamics of the yield curve into four phases. The first
two phases occur prior to the financial crisis. The second phase is characterized by
substantially less volatility of the yields compared to the first phase. However, this
is well explained by the simultaneous decline of overall financial market volatility
during that period as measured by the VIX.
The third and the fourth phase comprise the financial crisis. This means that
we can divide the crisis into two distinct subperiods. In the first subperiod, the
yield curve experienced very strong shocks in the short and medium maturity spec-
trum due to the freezing of the money market and subsequent emergency measures
taken by the Federal Reserve. The second part of the financial crisis began when
the federal funds rate reached the zero lower bound. From that point forward, we
find an absence of shocks hitting the yield curve at low and medium maturities.
Instead, the longer end of the curve experiences greater disturbances than before.
Secondly, we perform a (reverse) event study in which we match the greatest
shocks to the yield curve with headline news. We find that some large shocks are
associated with announcements by the Federal Reserve. However, a significant
number of shocks in particular in the recent past are due to international develop-
ments.
Thirdly, we identify and quantify the informational content of well-known macroe-
conomic surprise data. We find that that some, but not all of these variables have
lost significance in the crisis. The overall information content of these news vari-
ables with respect to the yield curve, however, is small.
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Appendix A. Spot and Local Volatility
This is a purely technical appendix which is not necessary to understand the
economic content of the paper. It explains the concept of “local volatility” that is
used in some places in the main part of the article.
We aim at quantifying the changing volatility of the innovations u. Simple vi-
sual inspection suggests heteroscedasticity. We fully acknowledge that this feature
of the data is not in line with the specification of the model. After all, we assumed
normally distributed homoscedastic innovations when estimating the loadings and
the VAR with maximum likelihood. Taking the heteroscedasticity fully into account
at the estimation stage of the model seems very challenging. Being aware of this
inconsistency, here we simply aim to measure the stochastic volatility of the inno-
vations as they present themselves from the model that was estimated assuming
homoscedasticity.
Consider a continuous-time diffusion,
dX t =µtdt+σtdWt, (A.1)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion. σ2t is the spot variance process, which is
not observed. Instead, we observe only X t at discrete points in time, t1 < t2 < ·· · <
tn. Based on work by Bandi and Phillips (2003), Kristensen (2010) establishes that
one can estimate σ2τ as
σˆ2τ =
∑n
i=1 Kh(ti−1−τ)(X ti −X ti−1)2∑T
i=1 Kh(ti−1−τ)
, (A.2)
where Kh is a kernel function with bandwidth h. This is a Nadaraya-Watson ker-
nel regression on the squared first difference of X . Spot volatility is simply the
square root of the estimated spot variance. In our application, X is one of the
factor innovations in the VAR model, i.e. u f for f ∈ {1,2,3}.
In order to estimate spot volatility, two choices need to be made, namely the
specification of the kernel function K and the selection of the bandwidth h. To
select the bandwidth, we use the cross-validation technique: that is, we minimize
the mean squared “leave-one-out” residuals. The kernel function K is symmetric
around zero if it weighs observations in the future the same way as observations
in the past. Most popular kernel functions have this property. Symmetric kernel
functions have, however, the disadvantage that for τ close to the edge of the sample,
they assign positive weights to observations outside the available sample, which bi-
ases the estimation. This is a well-known problem in nonparametric econometrics.
One way to address this problem is to use a locally adapting kernel function.
Such a function was for instance proposed by Brown and Chen (1999) and Chen
(2000). Their kernel function, based on the beta-function, automatically adapts
to the boundaries of the sample: for τ close to the first observation t1, the kernel
is right-sided, for τ close to the last observation tn, the kernel is left-sided. We
have experimented with this kernel but found it to give unsatisfactory estimates
in our application. The volatility measure has significantly more high-frequency
19
variability close to the edge of the sample than in the interior, which suggests that
the precision of the estimate deteriorates close to the edge, or that the bandwidth
becomes too small.
For this reason, we resort to an older, simpler idea that was proposed by Schus-
ter (1991). It consists of reflecting observations close to the edge of the sample
to the other side. So, [· · · , X tn−3 , X tn−2 , X tn−1] are appended in reverse order as
[X tn+1 , X tn+2 , X tn+3 , · · · ], and then the symmetric kernel function is applied to these
synthetically expanded observations. We use the popular (symmetric) Epanech-
nikov specification as the kernel function.
This procedure as described so far is, however, not very successful in our appli-
cation. The estimated spot volatilities turn out to be much too large on average.
Only about 1% of the absolute innovations are greater than 1.96 times the esti-
mated spot volatilities. It is not completely clear why this is the case. It may be
due to the fact that equation (A.1) is not the correct model for the innovations u.
After all, these are residuals and they have, by construction, no drift, so µt = 0.6
Because the spot volatility does not appear reasonable, we compute a slightly
simpler and maybe more transparent measure. We apply the Nadaraya-Watson
kernel regression on the squared innovations directly instead of the squared first
differences,
σ˜2τ =
∑n
i=1 Kh(ti−τ)X2ti∑T
i=1 Kh(ti−τ)
. (A.3)
This is the same as the approach suggested by Carroll (1982) and Hall and Carroll
(1989). They consider a model where the mean can be parametrically estimated but
the variance cannot. In our case, µt is zero by definition, so the setting is simpler.
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Figure A.8: Curvature innovations and 50% confidence interval using local volatility estimate.
We use the same kernel function and reflection technique as before and per-
form the cross-validation bandwidth optimization. The result is an estimate of the
6Consider E[(ut−ut−1)2] = E[u2t ]+E[u2t−1]−2E[utut−1]. In our case, u is serially uncorrelated
by construction, so E[utut−1]= 0. Consequently, the spot variance overestimates the variance of u
by a factor of two, E[(ut−ut−1)2]=E[u2t ]+E[u2t−1].
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volatility that seems much more reasonable. We call the square root of σ˜2τ the local
volatility, in order to distinguish it from the spot volatility. The size of this volatil-
ity measure appears more appropriate: 4.7% of the absolute innovations into the
long factor are greater than 1.96 times the estimated local volatility of this factor
innovation. For curvature, the corresponding number is 4.8%, reasonably close to
the 5% one might expect. Only for the short factor innovations do we find that
only 3.3% of the innovations are in absolute terms greater than 1.96 times the esti-
mated local volatility. Still, this is much better than the 1% we get when using spot
volatility. The optimized bandwidths are 47.0 days for the long factor innovations,
9.7 days for the short factor innovations, and 23.5 days for the curvature innova-
tions. Figure A.8 depicts, as an example, the innovations into the curvature factor,
as well as a 50% confidence band using the local volatility estimate.
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